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 I Introduction 
 
For some years now there has been a dispute running among biologists and 
philosophers of biology concerning the unit(s) of natural selection. It is a 
complex issue that involves many intewoven and sometimes unclear lines of 
argument. Several authors have tried to confine the matter to a generalized 
discussion of the conditions that a unit of selection should meet, leaving open 
the empirical issue of which biological entities actually manage to fulfill the 
requirements. Such a general discussion would in be based on the idea that a 
unit of selection can be found at whatever level of organization one can 
sensibly ascribe heritable variation in fitness between competing entities; this 
includes such dissimilar entities as genes, genotypes, traits, organisms, 
groups, species, etc. There is, however, in concepts such as fitness a sea of 
confusion that allows the interpretational disagreements one finds. General 
(definitional) discussions of what the unit of selection is leave on the same 
footing disputes that are of dissimilar nature, they mistakenly assume that 
genes' causal role in evolutionary processes is to be judged by the same 
criteria as the roles played by traits and entities of other organizational 
levels. 
A recent widespread position has been the so called "hierarchical" one, which 
proposes that causal responsibility of natural selection can in principle be  
attributed to any of the mentioned entities, leaving to empirical adequacy (or 
convention) the decision of which one is to be chosen as explanatory in a given 
selection process. It will be an aim of this essay to show that genic 
selectionism is not a proper participant in this dispute, as several authors 
take it to be. It is not the role of the exclusive bearer of fitness, or of the 
properties that are sources of fitness, that this position claims for genes. 
Genic selectionism is rather a claim about the causal (probabilistic) substratum 
that permit selective processes to have evolutionary significance. It refers 
basically to the fact that at whatever level of organization we might find the 
properties that natural selection pressures are picking out, evolution will 
require the simultaneous sorting of units with both causal influence over those 
properties and hereditary powers (i.e. genes or, more generally, replicators). 
Furthermore, the position holds that the latter will always be one fundamental 
component of the two part process. Richard Dawkins for instance was pointing to 
a real distinction, albeit in his strange wording, when he wrote that  
the conventional dispute between group selection and individual selection 
is different in category from the apparent dispute between individual 
selection and gene selection . It is wrong to think of the three as 
arranged on a single dimensional ladder, such that words as above and 
below have transitive meaning. I shall show that the well-aired dispute 
between group and individual is concerned with what I shall call "vehicle 
selection" and can be regarded as a factual biological dispute about units 
of natural selection. The attack "from below" on the other hand is really 
an argument about what we ought to mean when we talk about a unit of 
natural selection(Dawkins,1982,p.82). 
Vehicle selection, or as Hull prefers, "interactor" selection is meant to refer 
to what intuitively one would choose as the entity that, in a selection process, 
bears the property that makes the difference for survival and/or reproduction. 
The acceleration capacity of an organism, the average temperature of a group, 
the extinction rate of a family. In Elliot Sober's terms, it would be related to 
the immediate property responsible for (the source of) the fitness of all 
correlated biological units under the given selection pressure. Genic 
selectionism need not dispute such immediate causal role of different level 
properties, which can be synthetically described by the versatility of a concept 
like fitness. Genic selectionism, as Dawkins has insisted, is about a parallel 
process of "replicator selection". And there is a sense in which this kind of 
selection has explanatory primacy for evolutionary transformations, as it is in 
the end the responsible for the persistence of favourable trait-varieties. The 
amazing power of accumulation that natural selection has is due to the existence 
of hereditary factors that are in various degrees responsible for biological 
traits or properties. That a given particularity of a trait can re-appear in the 
descendants of the bearer is due to the possession by these of similar genetic 
information. That differential survival and replication of genetic elements play 
a specially significant role in evolution is beyond doubt, the point genic 
selectionists try to establish is that such elements have a causal or active 
role in their destiny, and not the passive one that some authors see, and that 
some of the terms used to refer to it (like "genetic reaction") tend to suggest. 
Richard Dawkins has been particularly concerned with the defense of such causal 
claim. 
To expose the specific sense in which one can affirm that genes (or genetic 
information) are responsible for their fate in the gene pools of evolving 
populations he devised the term "active germ-line replicator", with its clear 
Weissmanian implications. And it is precisely such causal and explanatory claim 
that has recently been challenged by several authors, among which Elliot Sober 
is prominent. Under the banner of a hierarchical view of natural selection, 
these authors argue against the granting of a special status to genes in the 
causal workings of evolutionary processes. My intention in this essay is to 
defend genic selectionism mainly against some of Sober's arguments. My main line 
of defense is based on the necessity of what is referred to by biologists as 
heritability (of traits, of fitness) for evolutionary change. It is heritability 
that gives substance to genic selectionists' causal claims, and it is the 
overarching necessity of heritability for evolution (whatever the "level" of 
property selection) that justifies the different explanatory status of genic 
selectionism. It is the genes' capacity of behaving as units of populational 
causal influence in the long run that genic selectionism stresses. Such capacity 
is due to their unique position at the vertex of the interaction and the 
replication causal chains. If vehicle (trait) selection is understood as 
interdependent with the sorting of genes (replicators), the coordination of the 
two causal processes has to be properly understood. Heritability is the 
synthetic term biologists use to refer to such coordination. Evolution occurs 
when selected for vehicle traits are consistently (i.e. causally) correlated 
with specific alleles. This fact is in the end what makes the causal 
contribution of both processes possible. Genes'(replicators') causal role in 
enhancing its kind's probabilities of survival and reproduction is, I will 
conclude, a precondition of evolution. Given that they are, so to speak, the 
ultimate bearers (units) of heritability, they have a probabilistic causal role  
to play in all evolutionary processes. There is, I think, no denial of this open 
to Darwinists. 
 
II Replicators and Vehicles 
Most biologists would nowadays agree that a good shorthand formula that 
describes evolution is "the change in frequencies of alleles in a population's 
gene pool". Another formulation widely accepted is that of the conditions for 
evolution to be produced by natural selection: that there be "differential 
reproduction of heritable fitness variation". As it happens, the causal appeal 
that distinguishes driven "deterministic" selection processes from purely 
statistical error sampling (drift) relies on an appeal to such a troublesome 
concept as fitness differences. Some authors have tried to avoid the problem by 
making use of statistical concepts (as "nonrandom" or "consistent") to qualify 
natural selection processes, and recently Hodge(1987) emphatically defended the 
use of "nonfortuitous" as the proper qualification for differential reproduction 
of heritable variation due to natural selection, because it stresses the causal 
character of the difference. The analysis of what the causal appeal in this case 
amounts to is central for the understanding of how explanations of evolution 
through natural selection are ultimately justified. Parallel to the so called 
"logic" of inferences based on natural selection, there is the task of giving a 
satisfactory general account of its causal workings. Much of the recent outburst 
of interest in the philosophical analysis of evolutionary theory has focused on 
this area, either on explications of concepts like fitness or adaptation, or on 
the question of at what levels and for what units natural selection exercises 
its sorting powers1.(1)  
The nonfortuitous differential reproduction of heritable variation determines 
frequencies of alleles in gene pools. This means that the survival and 
reproductive advantages that certain trait-varieties(or properties) provide to 
their bearers over their competitors, with alternative trait-varieties, are, in 
a sense, advantages of the genes (alleles) correlated with such trait-varieties 
against their allelic rivals. This correlation is what is meant by heritability 
of the trait-variety as a condition for its long term causal efficacy under 
natural selection. A given gene or group of genes should thus be able to re-
produce more often if its associated trait(s) is/are favoured by selection. Many 
authors have found convenient for the analysis of evolutionary processes the 
separate consideration of the two correlated elements (genes and traits) and 
some have even insisted that both roles, the re-productive (associated with long 
term permanence and conservation of characters) and the selective (associated 
with events of differential survival and reproduction in every instance) can be 
played by different kinds of entities at different levels of biological 
organization and in different selection processes. 
With this distinction, the causal question linked to natural selection becomes a 
dual one: What sorting interaction is able to discriminate between trait or 
property differences in such a way as to cause differential survival and/or 
reproduction of the bearers? and, as the second is sometimes worded, for whose 
benefit is the selection process working, or who is getting its  
kind through towards a bigger share in the next generations' biological 
lodgings? A derived question is, of course, which causal source is to be given 
priority for explanatory functions? 
                                                 
1 I emphasize for because crucially it can be taken to mean both the entity which benefits (evolutionarily) from the 
adaptations produced and the one that bears the traits or properties that are picked out by natural selection. This will 
have a close relation with Elliot Sober's use of the distinction between selection for properties and selection of objects. 
This division is the base of Richard Dawkins' distinction between replicator 
selection and vehicle selection (Dawkins,1976) and was modified by David Hull 
with the idea not to prejudge the question of causal primacy [as the term 
vehicle seems to do]. Hull prefers the descriptive connotations of replicators 
and interactors.(Hull,1981). According to Hull's distinction these two causal 
functions can be described as a) the reproduction or transmission of structural 
similarity (replicator) and b) the production of differential replication. 
Hull's worries about Dawkins attributions to replicators are symptomatic of the 
passive role concerning the causality of natural selection to which several 
philosophers have tried to confine the gene, urged mostly by biologists like 
R.Lewontin and S.J.Gould, who are, I believe, at least in part motivated by the 
social and political consequences of coarse genetical determinism. Hull wants, 
so to speak, to isolate the causal reach of genes. He writes: 
   Dawkins has one vice...he tends to run two quite      
   distinct functions together into one, replication and  
   the interaction of entities with environments.  
   (Hull, 1981) 
Hull believes that a Dawkins paragraph that shows this "confusion" is the 
following: 
   We may define a replicator as any entity in the 
   universe which interacts with its world, including 
   other replicators, in such a way that copies of itself  
   are made. A corollary of the definition is that at  
   least some of these copies, in their turn, serve as  
   replicators, so that a replicator is, at least  
   potentially, an ancestor of an indefinitely long line  
   of identical descendant replicators. In practice 
   no replication process is infallible, and defects in a  
   replicator will tend to be passed on to descendants.  
   If a replicator exerts some power over the world, such  
   that its nature influences the survival of itself  
   and its copies, natural selection, and hence  
   progressive evolution, may occur through differential  
   survival.(Dawkins,1978,p.67) 
Hull is worried here about the claim that genes always interact causally with 
their environment, in an evolutionarily significant way. He wants to restrict  
this function to interactors, and genes are only interactors in limited 
intracellular events. Dawkins however has in mind a specific kind of causal 
interaction in the above paragragh: the one exerted by the replicator on the 
interactor, and which is epitomized by the relation between genotype and 
phenotype; interactors depend causally on replicators, and that causal thrust is 
transitively communicated to the sortings in natural selection events. Besides, 
it seems clear that Dawkins has in mind only genes (or genetic materials) as 
replicators in "life as we know it", and that he chooses to use a general term 
in case of there being other types of replicators in other kinds of life. Hull 
however takes that generality in another direction, and gives a case for the 
possibility of other biological entities (as we know them) acting as replicators 
in evolutionary processes. The aim would be to have a general scheme in which 
optional units (genes, genotypes, organisms, groups, etc.) could be incorporated 
according to the peculiarities of the case. This kind of generality appeals to 
many philosophers but fails to do justice to the claims of genic selectionists 
(or for that matter, replicator selectionists) in the sense that the two types 
of processes should not be confused. Their causal workings are different and the 
hierarchical stance  
is not equally viable in both. For Dawkins a central tenet is the point that 
replicators have a double causal function: they re-produce their structural 
traits and they affect the characteristics of those interactors that are 
causally linked with them. Such difficult duality is a major obstacle for any 
hierarchical pluralism in the replicator "side" of natural selection processes. 
And, in any case, the capacity of the replicator to re-produce its (type's) 
structure is just as important for the long run (permanence-linked) processes as 
the capacity to actively influence its (type's) chances of doing so through 
causal links with selective (nonfortuitous) events. Dawkins thus wants to make a 
distinction between active an passive replicators. 
   An active replicator is any replicator whose  
   nature has some influence over its probability of  
   being copied. For example a DNA molecule, via protein  
   synthesis, exerts phenotypic effects which influence  
   whether it is copied: this is what natural selection  
   is all about. (Dawkins,1982,p.83) 
Hull however wants to loosen some of Dawkins' criteria for replicators. He 
claims that neither great fidelity (or identity) nor directness of replication 
should be asked for. He correctly points out that a criteria inspired by G.C. 
Williams would do a better job, this is that two genes are similar enough to 
count as the same replicator if they react similarly to similar selection 
pressures.(Hull,1981,p.150). But the wording here again fails to emphasize the 
gene's causal responsibility and the verb react suggests for them a rather 
passive role. Nevertheless the criteria is clarifying because it favours the 
causal or functional over the structural similarity. On the other hand Hull 
wants to leave open the possibility of indirect replication of structure (and 
with less than perfect fidelity), so traits, organisms or groups could count as 
replicators. What Hull fails to consider is that besides the reappearance at 
some point in the species life cycle of similar structures (or properties) 
linked with the previous ones by descent (reappearance which can occur 
differentially with or without natural selection), there must exist a stable 
link (manifested through a correlation) between genetic information and whatever 
candidate one chooses for the role of replicator (trait, individual, or group) 
if there is going to be some sort of evolutionarily significant (selectable) 
similarity. Thus, if we want to consider an extra genetic entity as replicator 
we shall have the problem of justifying such correlation in terms that do not 
duplicate the description in a nonsense way: replicators type 1 (genes) that 
produce replicators type 2 (traits, organisms or groups).  
For Hull it is enough for a replicator to be causally linked in some way with 
copies, however faithful, of itself. He leaves the significant causal role in 
relation to natural selection basically to interactors: 
   Replication by itself is sufficient for evolution of  
   sorts, but not evolution through natural selection. In  
   addition, certain entities must interact causally with    
   their environment in such a way as to bias their  
   distribution in later generations... the  
   characteristics of a good replicator are sufficiently  
   different from those of a good interactor that 
   eventually these functions began to be performed by 
   different entities at different levels of   
   organization. (Hull,1981,p.150) 
What Hull forgets here is that it was only the interactor role that became 
specialized in that particular way, i.e. by climbing the ladder of complexity 
and finding new levels of organization. The replicator function or, in other 
words, the conservation of information role, specialized without trascending the 
molecular level. Therefore it is only the interactive function that can be 
descriptively stratified in evolutionary biology. 
Active replicators must be causally linked with their own permanence in the 
evolutionary competition, and although they themselves do not have to bear the 
interactive properties or traits, they must somehow be linked to them. A 
probabilistic and populational causal explication has been proposed for this 
relation, and this is, as we shall emphasize, basic for genic selectionism. 
Given genes are believed to be causally responsible for heritability of given 
traits (thus they are correlated with them) and heritability is a necessary 
condition for evolution through natural selection. Hull's analysis, as many 
others of the anti-gene selectionist wave, seems to be based on disconnecting 
this link, i.e. on obscuring the fact that the base for the correlation between 
genes and trait-varieties (or interactor's properties) is causal and not in any 
sense spurious and, furthermore, that the direction of such causality is from 
genetic information to trait variety, and not the contrary.  
The use by Hull of Dawkins' term "replicator" (without the balancing effect of 
"active") is thus unfortunate because it fails to stress this point, which is 
crucial to the genic selectionist view. As we shall see later, the claim that 
such correlations bear no causal importance in evolution, absurd as it seems and 
is, has been defended emphatically by several authors2(2).  
Replicator selection and vehicle selection are then clearly two different but 
interdependent causal processes. The former, which is directly linked with 
permanence, is sometimes thought as the domain where one should look for \Ithe\i 
unit of natural selection, while the latter is said to be related to \Ithe\i 
"level" of selection (Brandon,1985). These processes can however be  
well understood without such definitional queries. Perhaps the clarification of 
the causal roles and relations between the different descriptive levels in  
evolutionary biology can be better attained by avoiding their confusions.  
There need not be \Ia\i unit or \Ia\i level of selection, but differing causal 
roles in the complex (two-fold) process of evolution by natural selection. 
 
 
III Gene-trait Correlations 
 
There is, I think, a misunderstanding of what the genic selectionist causal 
claims are. It stems from the tendency to fuse the discussions concerning  
replicator and interactor selection into a monolithic search for the unit of 
selection. Hull makes that evident when he writes about the poetic justice  
in that Dawkins... has taken the arguments which organism selectionists have 
used against group selection and turned them on the organism selectionists 
                                                 
2 Lewontin, Sober, Wimsatt, and Brandon amongst them. Rosenberg has argued, that a mistake at the root of this 
position is that they confuse the use of fitness or selection coefficients for genes in models with causal claims:"Neither 
genic nor genotypic selection co-efficients are causes of fitness or selection, they are effects of fitness 
differences."(Rosenberg,1983,p.333) 
themselves (Hull,1981,p.147). The reference here is to the arguments based on 
parsimony and simplicity of description that both G.C. Williams and Dawkins use 
to favour lower levels of selection against higher ones.  The basic structure of 
this strategy is to devise an alternative, simpler, explanation based on 
properties or traits borne by a lower level entity, to undermine a given claim 
that some trait needs a selection process focused on a higher level trait. But 
such discussions affect only vehicle selection. As I understand these arguments 
they could be rephrased by saying that it is easier to imagine how a (caused)  
correlation between genes and, say, organismic traits can be strong enough to 
produce evolution, than it is to conceive a similarly effective (caused) 
correlation between genes and traits of a higher level of organization. In the 
end, the parsimony arguments are not about what we have been calling the 
replicator role. Unfortunately, Elliot Sober shows the same confusion as Hull 
when he takes his acute criticism on parsimony based arguments as damaging to 
genic selectionism in general (Sober,1984a,p.234). It must be said, that both 
G.C. Williams and R.Dawkins tend to mix their appeals to parsimony with their 
more basic claim (that genes are always causally active in evolution) in the 
same confusing manner. This was pointed out by David Papineau, who advanced the 
distinction I am focusing on. When reviewing Dawkins' book The Extended 
Phenotype he wrote: 
   Much of the confusion surrounding the notion of "the  
   selfish gene" is due to Dawkins originally having run  
   two quite different ideas together. On the one hand  
   there is the basic Weismannian principle that natural  
   selection is at bottom always a matter of a certain  
   gene producing some effect that brings it about that  
   there is an increased proportion of like genes in the  
   next generation. And on the other hand there is the  
   modern ethological resistance to group selectionists  
   accounts of animal behaviour. But these two ideas have  
   very little to do with each other. There is nothing in  
   Weismannianism as such to rule out group selection. The  
   Weismannian principle that natural selection always  
   involves a gene increasing3(3) its representation in  
   the next generation leaves open the question of  
  how the gene manages this.(Papineau,1984.p.799) 
                                                 
3 A small modification will make more precise Papineau's statement, before "natural selection" he should have written 
"evolution by". 
Weismannianism is the real source of genic selectionism and makes a quite 
different causal claim than that which some arguments around the levels of 
selection are centered upon. By discovering the causal split between germplasm 
and soma, Weismann made possible a major clarification of the workings of 
evolutionary processes: The privileged situation of the genetic elements in what 
could be described as a causal vertex*, where on the one hand they act and are 
acted upon by their environment to produce somatic elements (properties or 
traits), and on the other hand the information they carry is differentially 
copied and passed on to future generations. Both are statistical processes where 
causation can only be understood in a probabilistic fashion, and where genes (or 
bits of causal information) function as causal factors.  
But genetic elements play different causal (and thus explanatory) roles in the 
somatic and in the germ-line sequences. On the one hand, that the germ-line 
(long run) sequence depends for its causal efficacy on the statistical outcomes 
of individual (short run) somatic sequences seems undeniable. On the other hand, 
somatic (physical) interactions (possibly at different levels) are causally 
responsible for differential survival and reproduction of biological entities, 
and they are in a sense the source of fitness differences referred to by 
abstract models. But the latter does not provide the other basic causal element 
of evolutionary processes, heritability, which links the germ-line sequence with 
somatic events. The fact that certain genetic elements tend in given sets of 
environments to favour the occurrence of certain trait-varieties gives them a 
major causal position in any evolutionary process. This was of course clearly 
perceived by the theoreticians that developed population genetics. The 
misunderstanding of what this stance of genic selectionists amounts to, has made 
possible, I believe, several recent mis-aimed critiques that tend to talk about 
genically based descriptions of evolution as acausal "bookeeping"4(4) based in 
some sort of spurious correlations between genes and traits. The most thorough 
and enlightening analysis, which nevertheless succumbs to this error, is Elliot 
Sober's recent book The Nature of Selection. In a considerable measure the rest 
of this essay will be an attempt to undermine Sober's arguments and conclusions. 
I begin then by quoting two revealing assertions: 
   the correlation of genetic characteristics with   
   organismic or group phenotypes in these [selective]  
   processes is what is represented in the different 
                                                 
4 This strongly suggestive expression is due to William Wimsatt(1980):"remarks suggesting genetic reductionism are 
better seen as having more import as a kind of genetic bookkeeping than as a promising reductionistic theory of 
evolutionary change in terms of genes frequencies" (p.154) 
   fitness values assigned to single genes. The existence 
   of such correlation is an absolute criterion for  
   evolution by natural selection, no matter what the 
   unit of selection is. But correlation is no more sure 
   sign of causation, any more than selection of is  
   no sure sign of selection for (Sober,1984a,p.284) 
 
   Selection for or against the phenotype may cause the  
   frequency of the gene to change but this will be due 
   to the correlation between the gene and the actual 
   phenotype. There will be selection of the gene,  
   but not selection for it.(Sober,1984a,p.313) 
Selection for and selection of stand in Sober's works stand for a distinction 
between causal and acausal processes. Based on the common dictum that 
correlation does not imply causation, he stresses the point that while a 
selective process can be based on sortings between kinds of objects at different 
organizational levels (selection of), it usually is the case that the efficient 
cause (selection for) of the sorting is a property (or properties) that might or 
might not be at the same level. This means that many other properties "carried" 
by the objects or entities are selected just by the sheer fact of being 
"correlated" with them, without having any causal connection with the selective 
process, and thus no explanatory thrust5.(5) 
Sober elaborates this distinction in the realm of statistical events where he 
equates population-level (or probabilistic) causation with what he calls 
property causation. Such view of causation is at the bottom of Sober's argument 
against genic selection as a separate and pervasive element of evolutionary 
processes. One of my aims will be to show its inapplicability for actual 
(historical) natural selection processes6(6).  
Both of the above quotes point towards the undeniable possibility of there being 
selection of genes without selection for them, but Sober is too quick in his 
generalization. There are two evident weaknesses in his assertions. First there 
is a clear and dangerous similarity between what he calls property selection 
(which he loads with causal powers) and what above was referred to as vehicle or 
interactor selection; and second the underlying assumption that the correlation 
                                                 
5 An illustration used by Sober to clarify his distinction is a children’s toy with small and big marbles that are sorted by 
holes through which only the small ones can pass. If all the small ones happen to be also all the green ones, then there 
would have been selection of green marbles and simultaneously selection for small marbles. 
6 In contrast with what would be ideal or generalized population causation in which infinite populations or unlimited 
trials would be relevant. 
between genes and selected for properties or traits has no causal base7(7), thus 
implying either that heritability is some kind of accident or that evolution can 
proceed based on a magically consistent (i.e. acausal) association between genes 
and traits8(8). The following quotes exemplify, I believe, both weaknesses: 
   In all cases of genic selection, a genic property is a 
    positive causal factor in survival and reproduction. 
    Cases of genic selectionism may differ, however, with 
    respect to what the objects are that these genic 
    properties attach to. Genic selection may impinge 
    upon organisms, upon chromosomes, upon gametes, and 
    upon genes themselves.(Sober,1984a, p.310) 
Evolutionary theory now deploys a striking hierarchy of possible selection 
mechanisms. Indeed it is a double hierarchy -of both objects and properties- 
that contemporary theory has had to consider. Objects at different levels may be 
selected; and there may be selection for and against properties at different 
levels as well. The adequacy of the various hypotheses made available by this 
hierarchy is subject of continuing empirical controversy, which philosophical 
reflection cannot resolve. (Sober,1984a,p.368) 
Leaving aside the conditions that Sober imposes on "positive causal factors", 
which will be dealt with later, I want to suggest a simple terminological shift 
which I consider revealing with respect to Sober's abuse of the versatility of 
"property" as a concept. If in the first quote one reads "genic effect" where it 
says "genic property" (and what else can a genic property that is attached to an 
organism or a gamete be?) the matter would, I believe, suddenly become 
transparent. And then one would be back to Dawkins' distinction between active 
replicators (genes) and vehicles (that carry "genic effects”), and furthermore 
it would seem unavoidable that, for all evolutionarily significant events of 
natural selection, at least some "genic effects" would have to be "positive 
causal factor(s) in survival and reproduction". Organisms, chromosomes, gametes 
and genes themselves appear thus as the vehicles (interactors) whose traits or 
properties are, at least partially, caused by "correlated" genes. With the 
elimination of the obscure property talk, the whole mystery of the above 
pluralistic second paragraph is thus dissipated; the mentioned double hierarchy 
becomes one (a vehicle hierarchy) which is connected to genic selection. Genes 
                                                 
7 As there is no causal link between the greenness of the marbles and their having been sorted out, in the toy described 
in note 4. 
8 Of course, naturally selective interactions can happen without there being a consistent genetic base (i.e. without 
heritability), and thus without evolutionary consequences in the population. Random drift on the other hand can build 
on heritability to produce fortuitous changes. 
causal role seems thus clear enough due to the awareness that although other 
objects might indeed be spuriously (acausally) correlated with any given 
selected for trait or property, genes are usually causally linked with them, at 
least in the evolutionarily significant cases. Genic selectionism mantains thus 
its special status as the explication of active replicator selection in our kind 
of life. Furthermore, it will by now seem evident that the search for the 
explication of what a unit of selection is in evolutionarily significant natural 
selection events is futile. Two complementary processes (replicator and vehicle 
selection) admit at least two kinds of "unitary" elements. And the former of 
those will always be of genic nature.  
 
 
IV Genes and Probabilistic Causation 
 
Genic selectionism, Sober (1984a) argues, has been faced by two standard and 
related criticisms: context-dependence and indirectness of genes' effects.  
The former builds on the instability of such effects from context to context. As 
Ernst Mayr famously wrote: 
   No gene has a fixed selective value; the same gene may 
   confer high fitness on one genetic background and be 
   virtually lethal on another (Mayr,1963,p.296) 
Some time later the indirectness criticism was aptly worded by S.J. Gould: 
   Selection simply cannot see genes and pick among them   
   directly. It must use bodies as intermediary. A gene 
   is a bit of DNA hidden within a cell. Selection views 
   bodies.(Gould,1980a,p.90) 
In their simple forms these objections can be said to be a product of 
traditional uncritical views, amongst biologists, both of causation, and of the 
relation between genotypes, phenotypes and selective events. To both these 
objections the facts of epistasis and pleiotropy are central, i.e. that genes 
can have many-one, one-many and many-many, causal relations with phenotypic 
traits. The ghost they are aiming at is that of "reductionistic bean-bag 
genetics" where only one-one relations are considered. But on the whole such 
worries have more to do with the problems of theory reduction in 
functional (synchronic) biological disciplines but not with evolutionary 
(diachronic) ones9 (9). David Hull (1974) has brilliantly analyzed the 
                                                 
9 Ernst Mayr makes this distinction clear in his characterization of "functional" vs "evolutionary" 
disciplines.(Mayr,1976) 
conceptual problems that arise from taking at face value the oversimplification 
of gene-phenotype links in classical mendelian models, and its consequence to 
the idea of theory reduction in genetics. But this discussion has no bearing on 
the position of genic selectionism10 (10) whose base is the probabilistic and 
statistical nature of causal links within evolutionary theorizing, and which is 
thus in no way tied to oversimple mendelian models. 
Kitcher and Sterelny (1987) agree with Sober that neither context-dependence nor 
indirectness objections, in their simple formulations, seem to damage the 
standard, statistical formulations of gene selectionism, which is not committed 
to "beanbag-genetics"11(11). Perhaps the clearest statement of the latter is due 
to G.C. Williams: 
   Obviously it is unrealistic to believe that a gene 
   actually exists in its own world with no complications 
   other than abstract selection coefficients and 
   mutation rates. The unity of the genotype and the  
   functional subordination of the individual genes to  
   each other and to their surroundings would seem, at 
   first sight, to invalidate the one-locus model of 
   natural selection. Actually these considerations do  
   not bear on the basic postulates of the theory. No 
   matter how functionally dependent a gene may be, and 
   no matter how complicated its interactions with other 
   genes and environmental factors, it must always be  
   true that a given gene substitution will have an  
   arithmetic mean effect on fitness in any population.  
   One allele can always be regarded as having a certain  
   selection coefficient relative to another at the  
   same time. (Williams,1966,pp.56-57) 
Sober has, perhaps involuntarily, wasted too much paper to leave it clear that 
the main claim of genic selectionism has little to do with the "parsimony" or  
"representability" arguments he deals with extensively (Sober,1984a,pp.234-
249)12 (12). It is the causal role of genes (as probabilistic causal factors) 
                                                 
10 Although it might have damaging consequences for those who defend non-genetical entities as possible replicators, 
because of the difficulty of the re-appearance, in a similar enough fashion, of traits (or structures) in the next (linked) 
generation. 
11 "advocates of genic selectionism have a very different picture of the causal relation of genotype, phenotype, and 
natural selection, one which, if true refutes both these objections" writes Sober (1984a,p.228). 
12 But Sober cannot resist the temptation to write fifteen pages demolishing a shadow. Parsimony as used by Williams 
and Dawkins to undermine group selectionists' claims is a pragmatical strategy that cannot be conclusive. Furthermore, 
it does not bear on what we have been calling active-replicator selection but on vehicle or property selection. That is 
and thus the explanatory value of their presence or absence in given populations 
and environments, that is the central issue. And that is why it becomes crucial 
to understand Williams' "arithmetic mean effect on fitness in any population" 
not as meaning that the gene will possess a fixed selection coefficient, nor 
that the affected "fitness" should be attributable to it or to any other 
entities (organism, group). It simply means that according to its effects on the 
different physical surroundings in which it is likely to appear, the gene (as 
type and as active-replicator) will have a certain general survival probability 
that can affect its future frequencies in the species' gene-pool. The particular 
kind of effects on which different genes' chances are based can be as varied as 
different selective biological interactions which can exist13(13). Such a 
picture of genes' causal influence on their survival and reproduction makes them 
appear not as causes of individual selective events14 (14) but, again, as 
probabilistic causal factors in populations of sometimes quite intricate 
selection processes. This immediately raises the problems of how to explicate 
probabilistic causation (in general) and of how such explication can help us (or 
not) in an analysis of genic selectionism. These were Elliot Sober's basic 
concerns in the positive part of The Nature of Selection. Basically, he takes 
both the context-dependence and the directness objections and transforms them, 
through his account of probabilistic causation, into much stronger and damaging 
arguments against genic selectionism.  
Under Sober's account, as sometimes genes can have opposing effects on their 
bearer's fitnesses in changed genetical and physical environments they cannot 
(but seldom) count as positive causal factors in evolving populations. On the 
other hand, as causation in its probabilistic or populational mode, is not 
neccesarily transitive, the biologist's intuitive "directness" objection gains 
strength and respectability. 
 
 
V Context-dependence 
 
For a gene to be a positive causal factor (p.c.f.) in a given selective process 
it would have to favor(increase the probability of) a positive outcome in at 
least one context and should not disfavor it (reduce its probability) in any. 
This is what Sober calls the Pareto-style requirement and what according to his 
                                                                                                                                                                 
because it centrally deals with the issue of which entity bears the property that serves as base for the sorting action. The 
issue of representability is a lateral one in causal discussions. 
13 Of course, this is precisely the rationale for the replicator-vehicle distinction. 
14 Something like Sober's property selection, or for that matter Dawkins' vehicle selection must occupy this role. 
analysis genes often fail to fulfill. Each context, following standard 
statistical relevance analysis15(15), is a cell from a partition produced by 
considering every causally relevant background factor (except the purported 
p.c.f.). Williams' quotation (above) can be understood as an appeal to consider 
that the average effect of the gene's presence in all the pertinent cells is the 
way to adjudicate a fitness value to such gene. Sober's objection is to consider 
that this procedure discovers anything causally significant. In reference to the 
archetypical example of the effect of smoking in a population he writes  
   there is no way to describe the causal role of smoking 
   in the population as a whole if the direction of the  
   probabilistic inequality is reversed by switching from  
   context to context (Sober,1984a,p.294) 
Averaging over contexts, as genic selectionists like to do, will only obscure 
the authentic causal structure. Although genic coefficients are sometimes 
readily obtained by such procedures they are not causally relevant: 
   As we have seen, it is always open to the advocate of 
   genic selection to reconstrue such processes in terms  
   of selection coefficients that attach to single genes. 
   The strategy of averaging over contexts is the magic  
   wand of genic selectionism. It is a universal tool  
   allowing all selection processes, regardless of  
   their causal structure, to be represented at the level 
   of the single gene.(Sober,1984a,p312) 
A simple example of what is meant here is given by heterozygote superiority 
where, as Sober and Lewontin (1982) argue, the selection coefficients at the 
genic level are secondary to those at the genotypic (allelic pair) level. 
Averaging, they claim, always might foster the illusion of selection taking 
place at lower level. But it is at the level where one can assign context 
independent (in this case: frequency-independent16(16)) fitness values where the 
unit of selection should be ascribed. Genotypes are Lewontin and Sober's 
candidates for playing that role in most selective events. An extreme case of 
                                                 
15 See for example Salmon,1984 p.158-182 
16 Frequency dependence is a special case of context dependence that is of special interest in evolutionary processes. 
The interesting aspect it provides is the changes in the causal workings of a causal factor when  
other factors of its type are part of the causally relevant background in different proportions. This is particularly 
important for selection processes where what is at stake is precisely the proportions of the causal factor in future 
populations (or contexts). Frequency dependence has been, I believe, rather confusingly used by Elliot Sober because 
he tends to overlook the fact that changing the frequencies of the causal factor is effectively changing the causally 
relevant background. We shall discuss this later. 
heterozygote superiority (in which both homozygotes are lethal) helps them make 
their point. The genotypic fitnesses would in such case be constant:  
AA=0, aa=0, Aa=1; whilst the allelic fitnesses would depend on the frequencies 
of each allele in the population. A alleles would flourish when a alleles are 
abundant (as they will tend to end in a heterozygote organism) and diminish its 
numbers in the reverse situation, where a alleles will flourish. Selection would 
always lead to equilibrium where allelic frequencies would be 0.5 for both a and 
A. Fitness values for each allele would be 1, and thus selection coefficients 
would be 0. So focusing on individual alleles would give the wrong impression 
that no selection is taking place. Genic selection coefficients... 
   are gerrymandered hodgepodges, conceptually and 
   dynamically quite unlike the genotypic selection 
   coefficients that go into their construction. For   
   genic selection coefficients are defined in terms of  
   genotypic selection coefficients and gene 
   frequencies...they vary as the population changes in  
   gene frequency, whereas the genotypic coefficients  
   remain constant. And if their uniform zero value at  
   equilibrium is interpreted as meaning that no  
   selection is going on, one obtains a series of false  
   assertions about the character of the population. 
   (Sober & Lewontin,1982,p.230) 
Another example, particularly dear to Lewontin, of similar genotypic selection 
processes involves genes from different loci. As different genes' effects are 
sometimes not independent, Lewontin writes, 
   It is only when the fitnesses at the two loci have  
   a multiplicative relationship that they can be treated 
   independently (Lewontin,1974,p.279) 
Here again there will be situations where genotypic fitness will depend on 
considering which particular alleles are occupying a place in the relevant loci, 
and thus any fitness value assigned to genetic entities below that level 
(allelic pairs, individual alleles) will be context sensitive, i.e. they will 
change according to the allelic frequencies in relevant loci17.(17) 
Even though we may be interested in following only one segregating entity...an 
understanding of evolution along that one dimension requires first a synthetic 
                                                 
17 An example of this is given by Lewontin and White (Reported in Lewontin, 1974), it deals with the interaction of 
two chromosome inversions in the grasshoper Moraba scura. It is also described in Sober & Lewontin,1982 
treatment of the genotype and then an abstraction of the a single system of 
interest from the complex mass. 
We cannot reverse the process, in general, building a theory of a complex by the 
addition or aggregation of simple ones (Lewontin,1974,p.281) the technique of 
averaging may still be pressed into service. But the selection values thereby 
assigned to ... genotypes at a single locus will be artifacts of the fitnesses 
of the...genotype complexes(Sober & Lewontin,1982,p.220) 
To describe the dynamics of genetic change in a population undergoing natural 
selection in the most causally informative(i.e. explanatory) way only single 
alleles' fitness value at a given time.(Lewontin,1974,ch.6) From similar 
considerations William Wimsatt produced his definition (ready-made for the 
genotype) of what a unit of selection is: 
   any entity for which there is heritable context- 
   independent variance in fitness among entities at  
   that level which does not appear as heritable context- 
   independent variance in fitness (and thus, for which 
   the variance in fitness is context-dependent at 
   any lower level of organization.(Wimsatt,1981,p.144) 
In the end, it is the consistency or stability of independent genes' causal 
influences that is questioned by such criteria. As replicators (to use 
Dawkinspeak) genes fail, according to this view, to affect in a stable way the 
fate of the vehicles they appear in. Only collections (ensembles) of genes can 
do this, it is argued, and, to bring the statement close to this essay's line, 
heritabilty will hence be a property of genotypes, not of genes. I will show 
later that these arguments, and others, based on the frequency-dependence of 
genic coefficients do not really undermine the genic selectionist causal claim. 
I would now just like to point out two evident sources for my criticism. One is 
the conflation between the mathematical procedures that produce fitness values 
and the (independent) physical processes and interactions that will justify (or 
not) such attributions18.(18) 
Many authors, including Sober, recognize that the mere ascription of fitness or 
selection coefficients cannot be taken as causal explanation of the processes 
described. The "implications of the mathematics of selection" writes Jonathan 
Hodge "must be supplemented with physicalist and causalist notions" and the same 
will be required in "considerations of adaptation and fitness" (Hodge, 1987, 
p.256). The other one is the biased distinction that is repeatedly used by 
                                                 
18 Rosenberg (1983) wrote against Sober and Lewontin (1982):"The assimilation of this theory [genic selectionism] to 
one of its potentially convenient mathematical models [population genetics] is a persistent error of this paper". p.333 
Lewontin and Sober between genetic contexts (frequencies) and extragenetic ones. 
Genetic context-dependence should not be considered as different in a general 
analysis of how natural selection works.  Kitcher and Sterelny have recently 
used an argument initially forwarded by R. Giere19 (19) in order to show how the 
apparent damage made to genic selectionism by frequency dependence is dissolved 
when partner genes and loci are analysed as forming part of the causally 
relevant background factors that need to be taken into account in the 
statistical search of causal factors. To quote again from Jonathan Hodge: 
   In specifying the environmental conditions wherein a  
   physical property difference has causal relevance to 
   survival and reproduction, we may have to specify what 
   the populational proportion of variants are. But to do 
   this is not to substitute mathematical for physical 
   factors, for the frequency differences only make a 
    causal difference because they have different 
    physical consequences. (Hodge,1987,p.258) 
Once again we are left with the central issue of causation. Context-dependence 
could not count as a criticism if genic selectionism were a claim about 
individual level causation. As it concerns the causal role of a kind (type) of 
gene in a population it is only when we consider replicator selection as a 
probabilistic and populational process that the gene, in opposition to the 
genotype, is clearly seen as the best candidate for the role of causal factor. 
Gene types must be taken to be independent causal factors. As Dawkins has 
pointed out, their size and limits should be understood as a compromise between 
their ability to copy themselves into the future (avoiding crossing overs, etc.) 
and their ability to causally improve their chances of doing so. The latter can 
be described as the ability of genes to be linked with favourable traits (in the 
Extended Phenotype view, where the trait need not be beared by its own vehicle), 
correlation which, I have insisted, is the basis of heritability. Sober is well 
aware that it is probabilistic causation we must deal with.  
                                                 
19 Ronald Giere (1984):"Sober is correct in pointing out that concentrating on the extreme values of r (r=0 and r=1) 
masks the frequency dependence of the causal factors. As before, however, we can unmask the dependence 
by making r an environmental parameter and applying the standard model to a negligibly small subpopulation of the 
original population. Thus the frequency dependence can be represented by a set of frequency-independent models 
indexed by the frequency r." p.391; Kitcher & Sterelny (1987) transform the above in a causal analysis:"[We 
shouldn't] be alarmed by the fact that the distribution of environments in which alleles are selected is itself a function of 
the frequency of the alleles whose selection we are following... the phenomenom is thoroughly familiar from studies of 
behavioral interactions"p.12 "the effect of each allele varies with context, and the contexts across which variation 
occurs are causally relevant" p.6 
The distinction between individual-level and population-level causality makes 
all the difference in the world when we consider how "context dependence" 
affects the truth and falsity of causal claims.  
   It is a truism that [individual] causes bring about 
   their effects ...Population level causal claims are a 
   different matter...if a factor augments some  
   individual's chances of an effect but diminishes the 
   chances of others the factor will not play a  
   determinate causal role in the population as a whole. 
   Here context dependence of a certain sort is enough to 
   defeat the causal claim (Sober,1984a,p.297) 
To refute genic selectionism under this construal of causation, as Sober writes, 
"it is enough to refute that all selection is selection for or against single 
genes". And this apparently can be done, as Lewontin has always believed, 
focusing on polygenic effects.  
   If a gene raises the probabilty of a given phenotype  
   in one context and lowers it in another, there is no 
   such thing as the causal role that the gene has in 
   general...The point is that ensembles may have 
   determinate causal roles in selection processes even 
   when single genes do not. (Sober,1984a,pp.313-314) 
This dismissal is a consequence of the Pareto-style requirements for positive 
causal factors. Before going into the analysis of such view of probabilistic 
causation, I again want just to point out a feature that can be appreciated in 
the previous quotations and that will help me to weaken such a case. The fact is 
that any causal factor that one can think of in evolutionary biology (replicator 
or interactor, trait or property) will fail to have an homogeneous 
unidirectional causal influence in the survival and reproduction of its type and 
of any "correlated" biological objects20 (20). Changing the environmental 
(background) factors (genetic or not) can always be a way to change the 
influence a causal factor has and it is hardly surprising that sometimes even 
the direction of causation is altered (from positive to negative, or vice 
versa). Biological populations are of course susceptible of being described and 
partitioned for statistical causal analysis using whatever causal background 
                                                 
20 "Sober's principle [that there is selection for a property P only if in all causally relevant background consitions P has 
a positive effect on survival and reproduction] seems to hanker after something like the uniform association of effects 
with causes that deterministic accounts of causality provide...[it] cannot be satisfied without doing violence to ordinary 
ways of thinking about natural selection"(Kitcher & Sterelny, 1987).p.12 One of their conclusions is that no causal 
factor whatsoever has unidirectional effects under natural selection. 
factors are viewed as relevant, but it so happens that sometimes part of the 
effects of causal factors that drive selective processes is to alter the causal 
background under which they are acting thus changing their own role. This is not 
exclusive of genetic elements nor, of course, is it the only way through which 
contexts can be altered. A specific way to deal with this situation has been 
devised by biologists but philosophers have only recently paid attention. It is 
to restrict the causal contexts under consideration to those more feasible and, 
crucially, to weight the causal influence such context (or environment) is to be 
given in the overall picture by its probability of occurrence21(21). The Pareto-
style requirement for positive causal factors (that they never lower the 
effect's probability) is in this manner blocked, and the overall causal 
influence of a given factor is reasonably ascribed explanatory thrust for the 
selection of the effect in some subsets of contexts. 
If context-dependence is a general feature affecting any probabilistic causal 
factor in evolutionary biology, and if selective processes are generally 
affected by frequency-dependence, the mentioned arguments favouring  
the genotype against the gene for the replicator causal role in natural 
selection collapse. Context-dependence must be incorporated rather than banned 
from the definition of probabilistic causation in evolution. 
 
 
VI Transitivity 
 
The directness objection raised against genic selectionism received a 
sophisticated exposition in Robert Brandon's paper "The levels of selection". 
(1982) Brandon first distinguished between the search for a unit of selection, 
which is what matters in the context-dependence discussion, and the search for 
the level of selection, where the directness objection applies. According to 
him, the former confronts genic selectionism with an alternative (replication) 
unit, the gene ensemble or genotype. The latter with an alternative 
(interaction) level, the phenotype22(22). Brandon uses the Reichenbach-Salmon 
                                                 
21 "A fully detailed general approach to population genetics from the Dawkinsian point of view will involve equations 
that represent the functional dependence of the distribution of environments on the frequency of alleles, and equations 
that represent the fitnesses of individual alleles in different environments"... "[in population genetics] the frequencies 
p.q are not only the frequencies of the alleles, but also the frequencies with which certain environments occur. The 
standard definitions of the overall (net) fitnesses of the alleles are obtained by weighting the fitnesses in the different 
environments by the frequencies with which the environments occur" (Kitcher & Sterelny, p.13) 
22 One must note of course the similarity of this distinction and that of the replicator-interactor (or vehicle) distinction. 
Once more, it is not the precision of the criteria for the dichotomy that seems most weak but the obscurity in which it 
leaves the causal links between both elements,i.e. the sources of heritability. 
notion of screening-off (Salmon,1971) to argue that differential reproduction of 
organism can be better explained by reference to the occurrence of certain 
favourable phenotypes. Given the information of their occurrence, the 
information about the underlying genetic elements becomes irrelevant for the 
causal explanation of the outcome. 
If A renders B statistically irrelevant with respect to outcome E but not vice 
versa, then A is a better causal explainer of E than is B. 
Screening-off typically is invoked with respect to correlations due to common 
causation, but of course it also applies for intermediate causes: more immediate 
causes screen-off more remote ones. So much is clear. What seems unsustainable 
is Brandon's claim that this undermines genic selectionism. As Sober has 
emphatically argued, as long as causation is transitive, arguments  
like Dawkins' [that it is in the end at the genic level where the causal chains 
start that end with differential survival and reproduction of biological 
entities] are unaffected by in-directness objections. Obviously transitivity 
implies screening-off of further causes by intermediate ones but that brings 
nothing new to the discussion. Either genes' differences produce different 
outcomes (effects) under the range of occurring environments or they don't. In 
the latter case they are undistinguishable by natural selection events and their 
relative frequencies will not depend on them. In the former they exert a 
transitive action and indirectly cause their (kind's) frequency dynamics. It 
seems to me that Brandon's argument is a strangely tortuous way to redescribe 
vehicle (or even property) selection, with which no genic selectionist would 
disagree. Evidently, whatever the source of the phenotypic trait it will have 
the same effects on the particular destiny of its bearer, but again it is the 
further consideration of a nonspurious correlation between traits and genes that 
allows an assessment of the global evolutionary significance of traits.  
But what if causal transitivity sometimes fails to apply? then the directness 
objection would be justified. Again, Elliot Sober uses the distinction between 
individual level causation and population causation to base his case 
against genic selectionism. Individual causes are transitive but population 
causes can fail to be so. He writes  
   The distinction between individual-level and 
   population-level causal claims also is important to 
   the question of transitivity of causal chains...the 
   analysis of population level causal claims implies 
   that that sort of causal relation is not in 
   general transitive.(Sober, 1984a,p.297) 
Perhaps genes cause phenotypes and phenotypes cause reproductive success. It 
might nevertheless fail to be true that genes cause reproductive success. If we 
interpret selection for X as meaning that possessing characteristic X causes 
reproductive success, we would have to say that natural selection is not 
selection for and against single genes. An effect of selection would be change 
in gene frequencies, of course. But the gene would nevertheless fail to be the 
unit of selection.  (Eells & Sober,1983,p.53) 
 Genes of a certain kind can produce different effects from context to context. 
They can both participate in polygenic (non-multiplicative) assortments or 
divide their causal workings in a pleiotropic mode. Within the same evolving 
population their effects can be spoilt, enhanced or counteracted. It seems to me 
however that again it can be argued that only when, within a range of  
contexts, a gene can manage to produce a certain positive (phenotypic) effect 
and this in turn in most cases does make a difference for survival and 
reproduction, the situation is evolutionarily significant. Transitivity of 
probability enhancement can also be context dependent and thus, as before, the 
possibility that contextual (genetic or external) factors might change a gene's 
causal transitivity (for instance neutralize it) is acceptable for genic 
selectionism. In their above statement, Eells and Sober take for granted that 
gene frequencies will be directionally changed in selective events, without 
realizing that for that to happen a causal link (heritability of the selected 
trait) must exist, and that is a restriction over the domain of events they are 
actually referring to, to those where transitivity applies! So the mere 
possibility that sometimes causation in populations will not be transitive [i.e. 
that the raising of the probability of an intermediate causal factor B by a 
previous causal factor A, does not necessarily imply that if B raises the 
probability of an effect C, so will A] does not make it irrational to develop a 
scientific hypothesis where one is interested in the cases where transitivity 
does follow, because that produces outstanding long term consequences in the 
behavior of the systems (evolution, for instance). Genic selectionism is that 
kind of a interested hypothesis. It depends on two beliefs: 
a) that only genetically determined fitness differences will produce evolution 
under natural selection, and b) that no matter how complex the pleiotropic or 
epistatic effects of individual genes may be, the competition structure of 
differential replication will permit that strong or persistent enough selection 
pressures will sort out better genes from lesser ones. This sorting between 
different genes at the same place and "for" the same function is what genic 
selectionism focuses on. That not all replicators are active (in Dawkins sense), 
that not all bits of DNA have adaptive causal interactions in/with their  
environments cannot be denied. But as Dawkins has insisted, the appropriate way 
to look at actual (active) genes is as the survivors in the subset of the actual 
sequence of environments. Evolutionary explanations of adaptations are not about 
neutral or indifferent genes or traits subject only to the fortuitous sortings, 
they refer to the subsets of both genes and traits that have had, and can have 
causal consistency in the long run. Traits owe their long run causal consistency 
to the genes that raise their probabilities of occurrence, and it is only those 
genes that have managed in the past to transitively (via traits) influence their 
own kind's probabilities of survival through the generations that can be said to 
have been active replicators. If differences at any vehicular (trait) level have 
been decisive in the past for evolutionary outcomes, they must in the end have 
been differences between the "correlated" genes that favored one or the other at 
different loci and in the prevailing contexts23 (23). 
Eells and Sober, just a few paragraphs after the above quotation, manage to 
produce a surprising assertion that goes against their stance:  
  Transitivity will be blocked only if the average effect 
  of the gene is deleterious [we can read causally 
  negative], and in that case we wouldn't be tempted to 
  say that there is selection for the gene in any event. 
  This means that it is polygenic effects and not  
  pleiotropy that poses a problem for genic selectionism 
  (Eells & Sober,1983) 
But polygenic traits are properly understood as causally intransitive only when 
their effects can have no consequence on genic frequencies; i.e. when 
heritability is null. There is then no variation at the genic level that 
corresponds to the variation at the vehicular level. Allelic fitnesses are then 
all equal and there is no consistent correlation between certain genes an 
certain traits or effects, so selective events will leave on average gene 
frequencies unaltered. No evolution occurs. Vehicle selection alone, 
disconnected from replicator (genic) selection, enters in a kind of causal 
neutrality. Equilibrium states under selection are somehow always due to such 
lack of correlation that make genes temporarily "invisible" to selection. The 
fact remains however that sometimes allelic differences are really causal, and 
                                                 
23 Dawkins writes: It is a fundamental truth, though not always realized, that whenever a geneticist studies a gene "for" 
any phenotypic character he is always referring to a difference between two alleles. 
(Dawkins,1982,p.92) 
And: a neutral mutation isn't a mutation at all, when we are thinking about legs and arms and wings and eyes and 
behaviour! (Dawkins,1986,p.304) 
not only structural (like neutral amino acid substitutions), and then overall 
neutrality between two or more competing alleles can only happen if their 
negative contexts (where their effects are adverse) and their positive contexts 
are perfectly balanced. That is, when they occur in exactly the proportions 
needed to counteract each other's long run consequences. This is exactly the 
proposal for some polygenic traits, such as birth size in humans. Granting the 
(difficult) possibility of such context induced neutrality does not however 
limit the genic selectionists' claim that all evolution needs genic caused 
selection. And, as Rosenberg pointed out for the case of heterozygote 
superiority24 (24), there is a sense in which there is really no selection going 
on in such processes. To state it properly: vehicle selection does not imply 
replicator selection, and only when it is causally coupled with it, does 
adaptive evolution proceed. Even if the contexts in which genes tend to appear 
will sometimes give an actual overall neutral effect that leaves its frequencies 
unaltered, a rather  
special (highly improbable) situation is required for this to happen 
continuously. It is reasonable however to suppose that even in the most complex 
and non-mendelian polygenic effects (traits) there can be a permanent although 
slow non-fortuitous statistical change in allelic frequencies, and that however 
minimal differences in different alleles selective values exist; i.e. the 
selection coefficients are not all exactly equal. This of course is the basic 
pervasive belief of neo-darwinism. So, once again, I have to emphasize the 
central role in evolution played by the probabilities that possible contexts 
have of occurring.  
Even if for an abstract theory of probabilistic causation all possible contexts 
must be equally taken into account, for the analysis and explanation of 
historical selection processes such generality can confuse the actual role of 
causal factors for given outcomes. A differential weighting of contexts is 
needed, emphasizing those sequences with higher probabilities of occurring and 
diminishing or ignoring those with lower probabilities. The counterfactual 
consideration that if other contexts had occurred the outcome would have been 
the opposite should not be an obstacle to explanation. 
 
 
VII Genic Causal Efficacy 
                                                 
24 "But since [in lethal heterozygote superiority] the gene ratios and the genotypic ratios in fact remain the same from 
generation to generation, it seems equally reasonable to deny that any selection is taking place in  
this case. There is a change in the proportions of surviving genotypes over time within each generation, but this is 
arguably no selection at all" (Rosenberg, 1983, p.335) It seems more adequate however to say there is no evolution. 
 
The time has come to pick up the loose threads I have been dropping in the 
previous sections and to join them in an attempt to give an interwoven answer to 
the criticisms raised against genic selectionism. I have up to now mentioned or 
suggested the following statements: 
-Genes (as kinds) are situated at the Weismannian causal vertex; they transmit 
directly their structure (replicators) and they interact causally with their 
surroundings (directly or through vehicles).  
-Both these causal roles make genes active replicators: they influence their own 
(kind's) survival and reproduction. Such influence is probabilistic 
and depends on the connection of two causal processes: trait or property 
production (epigenesis) and selection or sorting. All heritable fitness values 
depend ultimately on this interaction. 
-A kind of genic effects is the raising of the probabilities for the occurrence 
of certain traits or properties within a range of environments. 
-Trait or property differences account for fitness differences within a range of 
environments. Fitness differences are caused by internal and external  
physical differences, by their interactions linked to survival and\or 
reproduction. It would be better, in a sense, to say they are those physical 
differences. (See Hodge,1987) 
-Heritable fitness differences are those directly linked to differences at 
genetic level, when genes and traits are non spuriously "correlated".  
-Fitness attributions are expectancies of causal behavior (within a range of 
environments). They are not predictions nor explanations.(See again Hodge, 
1987)25(25) 
-Fitness attributed to any entity or trait at any level of complexity will be 
context-sensitive. As context changes brought about by the selective process 
(like frequency changes), or not, are  in the end physical and causally relevant 
changes. The range of environments where a given fitness value will remain 
stable can be big or small, that will only make a pragmatic, not a  
qualitative, difference.(See Kitcher and  Sterelny,1987) 
-Genetic environments must be treated statistically and probabilistically in 
similar way as external environments. Any "linkage" among genes would thus  
                                                 
25 "That fitness... is an expected quantity makes it appropiate to see it as a reproductive expectancy analogous to a life 
expectancy. Now, expectancies are in themselves not causal and so without explanatory content. For these reasons, it is 
misleading to conceive of fitness differences as causally mediating between the causes of a difference in reproductive 
performance and the difference in the performance itself. We should not suppose that physical property differences 
somehow make organisms differ in fitness and that those fitness differences then somehow make them reproduce 
differentially".(Hodge,1987,p.257) 
appear as coadaptation. 
-Genes as evolutionary units are best defined by causal rather than by 
structural criteria (although similarity of structure is of course required). It 
can be said to summarize their causal role in evolution that they are the unit 
of heritability. 
-However complex the vehicle or interactor, that is, at whatever level is the 
gene's effect finally being assessed, for adaptive evolution to proceed there 
should be allelic differences that are being picked out. Adaptation, i.e. the 
tuning of evolutionary change, can be attributed to selection acting 
independently, in a sense, at each locus. Of course, selection can fail to  
produce evolution, or evolutionary significant changes can be fortuituous and 
non adaptive, but genic selectionism can harmlessly accept both possibilities. 
-Genes, as probabilistic causal factors, can be said to be responsible, within 
given ranges of environments, for their (kind's) frequency in subsequent stages 
of selective processes. Overall effects, or averages, can 
certainly be indicative of their statistical causal performance. The possibility 
that in some contexts they will cease to have the positive causal effect 
(becoming neutral), or even have a negative one, is not a reason for withdrawing 
their relative explanatory thrust. 
 
Elliot Sober's mistrust of averages and overall analysis of causal factors in 
populations is founded on the open possibility that the correlations found by 
statistical procedures are not really indications of direct causal links, and on 
the symmetric possibility of there being causal links overlooked by statistical 
handlings. There are several conceivable situations in which overall 
probabilities provide a misguided impression of the individual level causal 
events that give rise to them, and on the other hand there are individual causes 
that cannot be considered causal factors for the general 
class or population of events to which they belong. If smoking increases the 
probabilities of heart diseases in the members of a population, and if 
exercising decreases them, and both factors (smoking and exercising) are 
somehow correlated, then the overall analysis will not reflect the strength of 
the probabilistic causal link between smoking and heart failure.[Unless of 
course exercising is considered as a causally relevant background factor and a 
further partition is produced]. What Sober argues is that, supposing correlation 
of smoking and exercising is produced by a certain common cause k, then there 
will not be a given stable causal role attributable to k in the population as a 
whole with respect to heart condition, even though in different subpopulations 
it can play positive or negative roles. Any purported positive causal factor C 
for an effect E must be assessed in relation to how it affects each individual's 
probabilities of attaining E. That is to say, how it affects the chances of the 
members of each cell of the partition generated by considering all the causally 
relevant background conditions. Average performance of C in the whole population 
can produce correlations between C and E but  
   Correlation looks at overall probabilities. It  
   compares the probability of heart attacks among  
   smokers with the probability of heart attacks among 
   non-smokers. The causal concept we are considering 
   looks at probabilities on a case-by-case basis; we see 
   whether each individual would run a higher risk of 
   coronary if he smoked. The overall probabilities need  
   not reflect the individual probabilities; this fact is 
   sometimes called Simpson's paradox. Even though the 
   overall frequency of coronaries among smokers may be 
   lower than the frequency among non-smokers, it may 
   nevertheless be true that each individual runs a 
  greater risk of a coronary if he or she smokes    
  (Sober, 1984a,pp.285-286) 
I believe that the above obscuring of the causal influence is better understood 
as a case of frequency dependence. It is only the frequency with which "smoking" 
will find itself (as casual factor) in the company of "exercising", due to the 
correlation postulated, that the overall analysis is, so to speak, misleading. 
Although it may be wrong to conclude that smoking is not raising each 
individual's chances (i.e. each exhaustive partition cell's26 (26)) of heart 
failure, the population's relative health is due to a contextual bias. To put it 
another way, it is only because in the population as a whole  
there will be few members of the cell that considers smoking without exercise, 
that this condition has little weight in the averages. If we imagine that heart 
disease will have a negative evolutionary consequence, (i.e. if we add a 
selective process to the example) and furthermore if we postulate a gene k that 
pleiotropically favours both smoking and exercising (thus accounting for the 
correlation), it is possible to see that the evolutionary destiny of such gene 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that Sober doesn't make clear in his analysis that, although correlated, smoking and exercising 
have to be considered as background factors, one for the other, when the partitions to search for their causal roles with 
respect to heart disease. So any individual will be representative of a cell, and his chances of having the disease will be 
equal to all the other members with and without the causal factor under consideration. Disconnecting correlated 
antagonic causal factors will then open the possibility to discern, statistically such antagonism. 
will depend at least partially on the frequency with which the negative 
effect(smoking) will find itself neutralized by the positive one (exercising). 
If for any reason the frequency of the individuals where only the negative 
effect is exerted rose, the gene k would be selected against. To come back to  
the non-genetical example: if somehow one could manage to disconnect the 
correlation between smoking and exercising (to have for instance all partitions 
of the same size) then the positive effect of smoking for heart disease would be 
made clear by overall statistics. And, similarly, if gene k is selected "for" it 
would mean that its positive effects are favoured by the context shuffling. This 
of course does not count as a general criticism of the view of probabilistic 
causation that Sober advocates, but it does undermine the plausibility of his 
view, as contextual causal workings acquire a major probabilistic explanatory 
role that Sober underestimates. I have tried show how the application he intends 
to make of his view in evolution is not valid, mainly because of the 
peculiarities of context occurrence for the behavior of evolving populations, 
which dramatically oppose his conditions for being a probabilistic causal 
factor. The so called Pareto-style requirement is somehow invalidated in 
selection processes by the causal importance of contexts' probabilities of 
occurrence. One should now be able to see the gap in the following assertions: 
   To say that there is selection for a given gene at a  
   particular locus is to say that possessing that gene is 
   a positive causal factor in survival and reproduction. 
   This in turn requires that the allele must not  
   decrease fitness in any context and must raise it at 
   least in one(Sober, 1984a,p.302) 
 
  [In heterozygote superiority] the a allele does not  
  have a unique causal role. Whether the gene a will 
  be a positive or a negative causal factor in the 
  survival and reproductive success of an organism  
  depends on the context (Sober,1984a,p.302) 
There is no evaluation of the actual causal importance of each context. They are 
all given the same weight. Taken to the absurd, in this position there would be 
no positive causal factors whatsoever. The heterozygote superiority case is 
illustrative of such mistake. When not at equilibrium the minority allele will 
enjoy a selective advantage because the context in which it will more often be 
found will have the "rival" allele as partner. As a consequence, its frequency 
will increase in the population. It would seem ludicrous not to acknowledge that 
such allele is a positive causal factor in that process (that presumably will 
drive the population to equilibrium) just because once the favourable contexts 
become scarcer its "causal powers" diminish. At equilibrium, the allele will 
have 50% chances of finding itself (after fecundation) in a good site 
(heterozygote) and 50% of being in a bad one (homozygote); what has been lost is 
the correlation, due to the allele plus the genetic environment, between 
survival and the possession of the gene; that is, in a sense, the heritability 
of the selected for trait. Evolution, as we have already stressed, comes to a 
halt. The causal activity of the evolving context, which in this case is the 
change in allelic frequencies, is as  important, and should be assessed as such, 
as that of the causal factors.  
Richard Dawkins has made that point over and over: 
   genes are selected, not for their intrinsic qualities,   
   but by virtue of their interactions with their  
   environments. An especially important component of a 
   gene's environment is other genes. The general reason 
   why this is such an important component is that other 
   genes also change as generations go by in evolution  
   (Dawkins, 1986,p.192) 
Part of Dawkins' emphasis since The Selfish Gene is on the tendency to find or 
generate stable and restricted environments that selection processes produce. 
That is precisely the rationale of the mediating activity of vehicle selection. 
And that can be extended, of course, to the selection of genetic company. 
Phenomena like linkage disequilibrium, and co-evolution of teams of  
genes are readily picturable as a kind of contextual selection from individual 
gene's perspectives. Of course, if the correlation becomes too strong between  
several (physically and causally linked) genes it almost certainly means that 
there is a very strong selection pressure that in the end is making every bit of 
the team a neccessary element for survival and reproduction27(27). In a sense, 
the phenomena might be better viewed by focusing on the ensemble as the causal 
factor (or replicator)  
so the possibility of strong linkage disequilibrium does not weaken the 
case[of genic selectionism]. It simply increases the size of the chunk of 
genome that we can usefully treat as a replicator (Dawkins,1982,p.89) 
                                                 
27  "It is clear that when permanent linkage disequilibrium is mantained in a population, the higher order interactions 
are important and the chromosome tends to act as a unit"(Slatkin,1972, quoted in Dawkins,1982,p.89) 
"...the unit of selection is a function in part of the intensity of selection: the more intense the selection, the more the 
whole genome tends to hold together as a unit"(Templeton et al,1976, quoted in Dawkins,1982, p.89)" 
Finally, to close this issue of context dependence, I want to insist on 
Rosenberg's point (1983, see note 18) that one must not confuse a causal and 
explanatory claim, as the one made by genic selectionism, with hypothetical  
(acausal) attributions of fitness coefficients to genes or alleles. If, in a 
typical situation, a given statistical procedure correlates an allele with  
survival under certain conditions (as often happens in geneticists' experiments) 
it is of course a healthy position not to attribute uncritically the cause of 
survival to the allele; at most that would be a possible working hypothesis that 
would have to be explored. Here Sober's cautions are more than relevant. But a 
very different matter is the case when we know or have reasons to suppose that a 
given allele's effects (within a highly probable range of environments) are 
included among the causes of differential survival. We have then every reason to 
consider the allele a causal factor, or as Sober would perhaps say, as a 
ultimate source of fitness values (See Sober,1984a,p.255). 
As has been suggested before, the so-called transitivity objection is closely 
linked to the context-dependence one.  Simpson's paradoxes, Sober insists, force 
us to focus on the movement of individual chances with the presence or absence 
of the proposed causal factor, instead of doing it on overall chances. 
I have suggested that for selective processes, where outcomes affect the context 
in which the next trial will take place, the sensible thing to do is to restrict 
one's attention to the probable contexts and the action of the  
causal factor in (sequences of) them. A similar suggestion applies for the 
intransitivity objection. An allele G can raise the probability of occurrence of 
an advantageous phenotypic property P, and P in turn can raise its bearer's 
chance of survival and reproduction(E), without there being a similar rise in 
the probabilty of E given G. In algebra: 
 
   p(P/G) > p(P) & p(E/P) > p(E) 
 
   but p(E/G) not> p(E) 
 
This situation can come about in different ways and it means among other things 
that genic effects will fail to be correlated with survival and reproduction, 
and it will also mean that selective events, even if they would somehow change 
the frequencies of genes present, will fail to bring about the reappearance in 
further generations of the selected properties (unless of course the population 
is in equilibrium, and so the frequencies were not affected). This is again what 
is known as lack of heritability, and is a major obstacle for evolution to 
proceed (as breeders well know). So once again, a restriction in focus to those 
cases where transitivity applies would seem a sensible move for the causal 
analysis of evolutionary processes.  
Transitivity of causes, even if not a general feature of probabilistic 
causation, is a requirement for the effectiveness of natural selection in 
causing evolution. 
 
 
VIII Conclusions 
 
I have argued against the sophisticated form of two basic objections against 
genic selectionism. Context-dependence and in-transitivity of causal influence. 
The former objection favours the genotype as the unitary genetic element 
(replicator) that is selected for during evolution by natural selection.  
One criteria used (Lewontin and Sober,1982)is the stability of fitness 
coefficients (mistakenly taken to mean stability of causal influence) with the 
changes of gene frequencies brought about by the selection process. The fact is 
that no context independent causal stability whatsoever can be warranted in 
selection processes (Kitcher and Sterelny,1987). Evolutionarily significant 
causal influence can only be statistically and probabilistically assessed 
considering the actual environments' probabilities of occurrence. Genic 
(replicator) selection will always depend on the causal differences between 
alternative alleles within the range of occurring (genic and external) 
environments. Such causal differences, obviously due to physical differences, 
will manifest themselves in different genes being correlated, in a range of 
environments, with different traits or property varieties, and thus with 
different selective values. Such correlation is the basis of those traits or 
properties heritability. Natural selection's efficacity as adaptation producer 
depends on that genic characteristic: being the unit of heritability.  The 
second objection, intransitivity of causal influence, challenges genic 
selectionism by favouring other levels of selection, besides the genetic, as 
causally fundamental in evolution. The idea is that properties from several 
levels of organization can be the cause of selective events. Genes it is said 
are invisible to selective events, as their interactive properties are 
restricted in scope to molecular intracelular actions. The phenotype, it is 
argued for instance, exerts the same influence on survival and reproduction, no 
matter what the genetic and environmental combination produced it. The answer to 
such criticism I have favoured is to say that replicator selection, which 
includes gene selection, is quite different in its causal structure from vehicle 
selection. The emphasis I have tried to make is in the idea that the link 
between both is captured by the causal correlations we call heritability. 
Transitivity of causation between replicators and vehicles is secured by it, 
specially in evolutionarily significant processes, in which natural selection 
drives the changes in gene frequencies in a population. Elliot Sober's central 
tenet in The Nature of Selection is that for every process of evolution under 
natural selection there is one and only one causal description that depicts the 
real workings of natural selection. If for instance the property that is being 
used as sorting criteria (that is being selected for) is a group property, then 
only group selection will  explain appropriately the process. Richard 
Dawkins(1982) and, recently, Kitcher and Sterelny (1987) defend the view that 
several adequate representations of selection processes are always possible, and 
that it is the maximalization of such adequacy what makes genic selection the 
better option.  
   For any selection process there is a maximally  
   adequate representation that attributes causal  
   efficacy to genic properties. (Kitcher & Sterelny,  
   1987, p.33)  
The discussion of course  runs in parallel with the general dispute within 
Philosophy of Science between realists (Sober) and empirists (Kitcher). I have 
been trying to show why I believe both positions are mistaken with respect to 
genic selectionism. Their basic mistake is to suppose there is a competition for 
being the unit of selection, and that the gene is one of the participants. My 
view is that the gene has in evolutionary processes a separate causal role which 
has no alternative. It is not the same causal role that Sober calls property 
selection (and that Kitcher and Sterelny follow in the above reference), and 
which is best understood as an explication of Dawkins' vehicle selection. The 
latter can be said to be the territory where these disputes between the 
alternative units and/or levels of selection, and between the philosophical 
stances are really taking place. But they only cover one aspect of a dual 
process; an aspect that seems still rather confused. Conceptually, the talk of 
property selection, or of trait selection or, generally  of vehicle or 
interactor selection, seems to perpetuate the difficulties that previous 
concepts, like fitness, presented. 
Replicator selection is much better understood. It means the selection of genes 
and, however passive a role some authors want to establish for them as selected 
objects, it is the active rising of the survival and reproduction  
probabilities of their kind in the given range of environments what will be 
evolutionarily significant. And that cannot be but causal and explanatory. 
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